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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies integration of regional goods markets in Russia over 2001–2019, analyzing 
the law of one price. The analysis involves all pairs of country’s regions, which provides a 
comprehensive spatial pattern of market integration. The region pairs are classified as 
belonging to one of four groups: integrated, conditionally integrated, not integrated but 
tending towards integration (converging) and neither integrated nor tending towards 
integration (among these, diverging). On average, a region is found to be perfectly and 
conditionally integrated with 48.7% of other regions and tending towards integration with 
3.3% of them. Non-integration is due to random walking (41.2%) and deterministic 
divergence (6.8%). Geographical reasons explain the pattern obtained only partially. 
Apparently, idiosyncratic features of regional markets play a main role in non-integration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study aims at obtaining a comprehensive pattern of integration of regional markets in 
Russia. Such a pattern reveals the role of every region of the country in integration, showing 
its relationship with each of other regions. Studies of this kind are very rare in the literature. In 
the case of Russia, the spatial pattern of integration is especially interesting, taking account of 
its vast territory (with the average distance between regions of 3,600 km, reaching circa 
15,000 km between the extreme regions), diverse natural conditions of regions (from near-
subtropical in the South-West to Arctic in the North), and poor transport accessibility of a 
number of regions (in the North-East of the country).   
To be more specific, a definition of spatial market integration exploited in this study 
should be provided, since there is no generally accepted definition (Fackler & Goodwin, 2001; 
Barrett, 2008). Intuitively, a set of regional markets for a (tradable) good is integrated if there 
are no barriers to trade between regions, except for ‘natural’, geographically determined 
barriers, i.e. disconnectedness of regions (commonly quantified by transportation costs). In the 
integrated market, goods arbitrage results in spatial equilibrium that manifests itself in the law 
of one price. In its strict form, when transportation costs may be neglected (e.g., if they are 
very small as compared to the price of the good), the law states that the price of the same good 
should be equal across all regions. A weak version of the law takes account of ‘natural’ 
barriers to trade, allowing the price of the good to differ between two regions by no more than 
transportation costs. Thus, the law of one price can be applied as the criterion of market 
integration (which is a widespread methodology in studies of market integration). It is worth 
noting that direct trade between two regions is not necessary for them to be integrated; 
regional prices can interact indirectly through a trading network of regions (Fackler & 
Goodwin, 2001).  
To obtain the comprehensive spatial pattern of integration, the law of one price is 
analyzed for every pair of Russian regions. Time series of regional prices for an aggregated 
good (staples basket) over 2001–2019 serve as empirical material. The analysis distinguishes 
among different ‘grades’ of market integration, classifying the region pairs as belonging to one 
of four groups.  
The first one consists of perfectly integrated pairs, i.e. those where the strict law of one 
price holds. The second group comprises conditionally integrated pairs, where the weak law of 
one price holds. The regions in a pair could be acknowledged as integrated on condition that 
the difference in prices between them is due to transportation costs only. However, it can 
 3
include also effects or ‘artificial’ impediments to integration, such as regional protectionism, 
local price regulations, organized crime, etc. Therefore, according to the above definition of 
market integration, the term ‘conditional integration’ is applied. The third group relates to a 
case that is intermediate between integration and non-integration. It includes region pairs 
tending towards integration. They are those where the law of one price does not hold (in either 
version), but regional prices converge to each other in the long run, eventually eliminating the 
price disparity. Note that this concept of convergence implies catching-up of prices, and not 
dying out of random deviations from the price parity, as not infrequently is meant in the 
literature. The movement towards integration is modelled by a nonlinear asymptotically 
decaying trend of price disparity. At last, the fourth group consists of neither integrated nor 
tending-towards-integration region pairs (among these, pairs with random walking and 
deterministic divergence are distinguished).  
The results obtained suggest that 20.5% of region pairs are perfectly integrated, 28.2% 
of them are conditionally integrated, and 3.3% of pairs are tending towards integration. Non-
integration is due to random walking (41.2%) and deterministic divergence (6.8%). These 
figures can be related to an average region, showing a proportion of other regions with which 
it is perfectly or conditionally integrated and so on. Further analysis reveals that although the 
role of distance in conditional integration prevails, ‘artificial’ impediments to integration 
(quantified by differences in markups) are not negligible, contributing on average 7.4% to the 
price differential in conditionally integrated pairs and decreasing the probability of perfect 
integration. However, the distance explains non-integration partially, in some subsamples of 
region pairs only. This leads to a conclusion that the reasons for non-integration are for the 
most part idiosyncratic.     
Numerous publications analyze integration of intra-national product markets (not 
infrequently, represented by a set of cities rather than regions) by testing for the law of one 
price. However, as mentioned above, they very rarely deal with interaction of each region/city 
with other ones. The most probable reason is the dimensionality problem. To obtain a 
comprehensive spatial pattern of market integration, the law of one price should be tested for 
each pair of regions. The number of the pairs rises quadratically with the number of regions, 
N, equaling N(N – 1)/2, which makes the analysis overly cumbersome.  
One way to reduce dimensionality applied in the literature is the use of panel data 
analysis. Such an approach is exploited, e.g., by Parsley & Wei (1996) for the U.S., by Esaka 
(2003) for Japan, and by Horvath & Vidovic (2005) for Slovakia. They pool time series of the 
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price for a given product across all regions into a data panel. This yields only a 
characterization of the country’s market (for every product under consideration) as a whole 
with no spatial dimension.  
Another way is to use some region/city as a benchmark, so reducing the number of pairs 
to N – 1. This method is applied, e.g., by Ceglowski (2003) for Canada, by Gluschenko (2011) 
for Russia, and by Iregui & Otero (2011) for Colombia. Such a method does provide a spatial 
pattern of market integration. However, it is only partial. It shows integration of the 
benchmark region with each of other regions, but is silent as to integration of these other 
regions with one another. A consequence is that the pattern obtained crucially depends on the 
choice of the benchmark (see, e.g., Chmelarova & Nath, 2010). A different version of this 
method exists, where the benchmark is the whole national market. In this case, the national 
price (weighted or unweighted average of regional prices) serves as the numeraire. This way is 
used, e.g., by Fan & Wei (2006) and Ritola (2008) for China, and by Akhmedjonov & Lau 
(2012) for Russia. Here, the results are difficult to interpret. Indeed, what is the intuitive sense 
of integration of a region with the whole national market?  
A rare exception is an analysis performed by Yazgan & Yilmazkuday (2011), who 
analyze the law of one price for each pair of U.S. cities from their sample. Unfortunately, their 
results are reported in an overly summarized form, so that the spatial pattern is not seen in 
them.  
This study contributes to the above literature in three aspects. First, it obtains a 
comprehensive pattern of intra-country market integration. Second, it considers, in addition to 
integration as such, convergence to integration, analyzing it in a straightforward way. Third, it 
tries to find factors responsible for the pattern obtained. The study also relates to work by 
Yilmazkuday (2018), analyzing the role of retail margins, albeit in a different way. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents models exploited in 
the analysis and econometric strategy. The third section describes empirical data to be 
analyzed. The fourth section reports and discusses the results of the analysis. The fifth section 
compares results obtained with those for 1994–2000. The sixths section summarizes the study. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Models 
Let prt and pst be prices for a tradable good in regions r and s (r, s = 1,…, N) at period t,        
Prst = ln(prt/pst) being the price differential. It is worth noting that the use of the relative number as 
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the price variable eliminates common factors from it (in particular, countrywide inflation). 
The economic model of the strict law of one price looks like prt/pst = 1 or Prst = 0 for     
t = 0,…, T and a region pair (r, s). The law can hold only statistically in reality, accurate to 
random shocks t supposed to be autocorrelated (to economize notation, the region indices for 
disturbances and model parameters are suppressed). Then the econometric model of the strict 
law of one price has the form Prst = t, t = ( + 1)t-1 + t, where  + 1 =  is the 
autoregression coefficient, and t is the Gaussian white noise. Substituting the second equation 
into the first one gives the conventional AR(1) model with no constant: 
Prst = Prs,t–1 + t,         (1) 
 where  is the first difference operator. The law of one price holds if time series Prst is 
stationary (contains no unit root). In this case, regions r and s are deemed perfectly integrated 
with each other. 
The weak law of one price can be modelled as prt/pst = 1 + crs or Prst = Crs  ln(1 + crs), 
where crs represents time-invariant arbitrage transaction costs (in percentage terms).1 Based on 
the same considerations as above, we get from our model Prst = Crs the conventional AR(1) 
model with constant  = –Crs: 
Prst =  + Prs,t–1 + t.         (2) 
The weak law of one price holds if time series Prst is stationary about a nonzero constant. In 
such an event, regions r and s are deemed conditionally integrated with each other. As noted in 
the introduction, they could be acknowledged as integrated on condition that the price 
disparity Crs is due to transportation costs only. In the framework of time series analysis, it is 
impossible to reveal the nature of Crs. (A cross-sectional analysis of estimates of Crs in the 
fourth section confirms that not only transportation costs contribute to them.) As a rule, 
conventional definitions of market integration – sometimes, implicit – based of the law of one 
price do not limit barriers to trade to ‘natural’ barriers only (so differing from the definition 
stated in the introduction). Thus, there is no room for conditional integration under such 
definitions. 
The movement towards integration implies convergence of prices (catching-up) 
between regions r and s. Following Gluschenko (2011), an asymptotically decaying trend crs(t) 
                                                          
1 This is not a sole way to model the weak law of one price. An alternative version of the 
model is ln(1 – crs)  Prst  ln(1 + crs) or, assuming the ‘iceberg’ representation of transaction 
costs,  –Crs  Prst  Crs. Econometrically, this leads to threshold autoregression models. For instance, O’Connell & Wei (2002) use two kinds of such models. 
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models convergence: prt/pst = 1 + crs(t) or Prst = Crs(t)  ln(1 + crs(t)), where crs(t)  0 as t  
, and dcrs(t)/dt < 0. This relationship is close to the definition of convergence suggested by 
Bernard & Durlauf (1995). However, such a concept of price convergence differs from that 
not infrequently used with regard to the law of one price. The concept adopted considers an 
actual convergence process as a superposition of two processes that can be called long-run, or 
deterministic, convergence and short-run, or stochastic, convergence. Long-run convergence is 
a deterministic path of the price disparity, Crs(t), that tends to zero over time. Short-run 
convergence is an autocorrelated stochastic process containing no unit root (i.e., a stationary 
process), t = ( + 1)t-1 + t. Intuitively, short-run convergence characterizes the behavior of 
transient random shocks. A unit shock deflects the price disparity from its long-run path, dying 
out over time with half-life  = ln(0.5)/ln( + 1), so that the price disparity eventually returns 
to its long-run path. The superposition of these two processes gives a process that is stationary 
around an asymptotically subsiding trend Crs(t). That is, albeit random shocks force the 
process to deviate from the trend, it permanently tends to return to the trend, thus satisfying 
the above condition (Crs(t)  0 as t  ). The following econometric model describes the 
superposition of the long-run and short-run convergences: 
Prst = Crs(t) – ( + 1)Crs(t – 1) + Prs,t–1 + t.      (3) 
It should be noted that Models (1) and (2) in fact also describe the superposition of a 
long-run path of the price differential and fluctuations around it. The difference is that the 
long-run paths are time-invariant: Crs(t) = 0 in Model (1) and Crs(t) = –/ in Model (2). 
Therefore, only short-run properties of adjustment towards the long-run path are of interest, 
hence the terms ‘convergence to the law of one price’ or simply ‘price convergence’ applied to 
such processes (e.g., Das & Bhattacharya, 2008, and Goldberg & Verboven, 2005, to name a 
few). The difference between such a concept of convergence and the concept exploited here is 
clearly seen from examples in the fourth section, comparing Figure 3(a)/(b) with Figure 3(c). 
This study uses three modes of the convergence trend (as opposed to Gluschenko, 
2011, where only the log-exponential trend is exploited). The first one is the log-exponential 
trend C(t) = ln(1 + et),  < 0; the second is the exponential trend C(t) = et,  < 0; and the 
third is the fractional trend C(t) = /(1 + t),  > 0. The respective nonlinear econometric 
models have the forms: 
Prst = ln(1 +et) – ( + 1)ln(1 + e(t – 1)) + Prs,t–1 + t;     (3a) 
Prst = et – ( + 1)e(t – 1) + Prs,t–1 + t;       (3b) 
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Price convergence takes place if time series Prst is stationary about one or more of these 
trends and parameter  has the expected (for the given trend) sign. Then regions in the pair (r, 
s) are deemed to move towards integration with each other.  
Similarly to the half-life time of random deviations from the long-run path, the semi-
convergence time of the deterministic price disparity, , can be defined as the time the 
disparity takes to halve. For the log-exponential trend,  = ln(0.5)/; for the exponential trend, 
)))1(5.0ln(ln(1 
  eΘ ; and for the fractional trend, )1))1(5.0ln((
1  

 eΘ . The initial 
(at t = 0) price disparity in real terms, pr0/ps0 – 1, is  in the log-exponential trend, and e – 1 in 
the exponential and fractional trends. 
 The same models with ‘wrong’ signs of  ( > 0 in the log-exponential and 
exponential trends, and  < 0 in fractional trend) characterize deterministic divergence. Its rate 
can be defined as the time the disparity takes to double; for example, it equals ln(2)/ for the 
log-exponential trend with  > 0.  
 If no one of Models (1)–(3) describes the behaviour of prices in region pair (r, s), the 
case at hand is a random walk. Such regions as well as diverging regions are deemed neither 
integrated nor tending towards integration with each other (hereafter, simply non-integrated 
regions for brevity). 
With the econometric models in hand, it becomes possible to give a more evolved 
explanation of why the benchmark approach is not able to provide a comprehensive spatial 
pattern of market integration. In fact, only N – 1 of all region pairs are independent. From their 
time series, it is possible to generate the time series for any other region pair. Let r be a 
benchmark region. From Prst and Prqt, we can get Pqst as Prst – Prqt. Then, seemingly, the fact 
that regions s and q are perfectly integrated with the benchmark region – i.e. both Prst and Prqt 
satisfy Equation (1) – gives grounds to conclude that regions q and s are also perfectly 
integrated with each other. However, this is not the case, since autocorrelation of time series 
leads to non-transitivity of statistical inference. It is easily seen that subtraction of Equation 
(1) for Prqt from that for Prst does not yield a model of the form (1) for Pqst (unless estimates of 
 for both Prst and Prqt are equal). Therefore, Pqst may satisfy any one of the above models or 
even no one. And vice versa, be Prst and Prqt unit root processes (random walks), Pqst might 
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nonetheless manifest regularity of some form described by Models (1)–(3). The fourth section 
gives an actual example of non-transitivity. 
 
Strategy of estimating and testing 
If a time series Prst satisfies more than one model from their set (1)–(3), the ‘most proper’ 
model is to be selected. Two approaches are possible, namely from general to specific and 
from specific to general. The general model in the set is Model (3). It encompasses the rest of 
models: imposing restriction  = 0 in C(t), we get Equation (2), and  = 0 produces Equation 
(1). Then the analysis of a time series goes from the general Equation (3) to Equation (2) and 
then to Equation (1), accepting the first significant model in this sequence.  
Albeit the general-to-specific approach seems attractive from the theoretical point of 
view, the further analysis applies the specific-to-general approach, based on the following 
intuitive considerations. If a time series satisfies both Equations (1) and (2), it is reasonable to 
assume that although constant  in Equation (2) is statistically significant, it is small and is 
caused by some accidental reasons (being a statistical artefact) rather than by properties of the 
process itself. Hence, it is logical to accept Model (1). Similarly, when a time series satisfies 
both Equations (2) and (3), the reason is a very weak trend, maybe, incidentally manifesting 
itself in the data. Hence, the model without trend, Model (2), should be accepted. A random 
inspection of some such cases has confirmed these assumptions. All three versions of Equation 
(3) are estimated for each region pair, selecting a version that provides the best fit (the 
minimal sum of squared residuals) if they turn out to be completive. The test for statistical 
significance of parameters  and  applies 10% as the critical level.  
To test the unit root hypothesis, H0:  = 0 (against  < 0), the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test and Phillips-Perron (PP) test are applied. The hypothesis of non-stationarity H0 is 
deemed rejected if both tests reject it at the level of 10%. The procedure of testing is as 
follows. 
The ADF test uses an auxiliary regression with additional lags of the dependent 
variable: tmtrsMm mtrsrst PPththP     ,11,00 )1()1()( , where h() is 
zero for Equation (1), a constant for Equation (2), and a trend C() for Equation (3). The 
choice criterion of optimal lag length M = M* is a modified Bayesian (Schwarz) information 
criterion with a sample-dependent penalty factor. This modification is due to Ng & Perron 
(2001), who find that the standard information criteria tend to select lag lengths that are 
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generally too small for unit root tests to have good sizes. Besides, the effective number of 
observations is held fixed when estimating the auxiliary regression with different M 
(according to Ng & Perron, 2005).  
Note that the auxiliary regression is merely technical: it serves only for obtaining the 
adjusted value of the test statistic. The estimates of  and other regression parameters should 
be taken from the original regression. The literature on the law of one price (as well as on 
purchasing power parity) sometimes reports parameter estimates from the auxiliary regression. 
There are two arguments against this. First, it is the original regression, e.g., (1) or (2), that 
models the phenomena under consideration, and not the auxiliary regression. Second, 
parameter estimates should not depend on a test applied. Otherwise, we would have different 
values of them depending on whether the ADF test or, say, the PP test has been used. 
The PP test applied exploits the OLS autoregressive spectral method (in doing so, the 
lag length selection is the same as described above for the ADF test). As Perron & Ng (1996) 
find, this make it possible to avoid size distortions that arise because of the use of kernel-based 
spectral density estimators.  
The above testing procedure is more severe in rejecting the unit root hypothesis than 
commonly used procedures. First, the both applied tests should agree to the rejection.2 Second, 
the use of the sample-adjusted information criterion in the ADF test leads to less frequent 
rejection of nonstationarity than in the case of the standard information criteria. Third, the 
application of the autoregressive spectral density estimator in the PP test, as opposed to 
kernel-based estimators commonly used, also gives less frequent rejection of nonstationarity. 
Gluschenko (2011) applies simultaneous rejection of the unit root hypothesis by the ADF and 
PP tests, however, exploiting the standard Schwarz criterion in the former and the Bartlett 
spectral kernel in the latter. 
 
DATA 
The Russian Federation consists of constituent units (republics, oblasts, one autonomous 
oblast, krais, autonomous okrugs, and federal cities) termed federal subjects. Despite different 
designations, all these are equal in legal terms. In this study, a federal subject (including 
federal cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg) is meant by a region, ‘composite’ federal 
subjects (that include autonomous okrugs) being considered as single regions. The spatial 
                                                          
2 Yazgan & Yilmazkuday (2011) use even seven unit root tests; however, they do not require 
them to be in agreement, separately reporting summarized results of applying each test. 
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sample covers 79 regions, all Russia’s regions – as of 2001 – but the Chechen Republic that 
lacks full time series. They generate 3081 region pairs.  
The empirical data to be analyzed relate to an aggregated good, a staples basket 
comprising 33 basic foods. This basket was introduced by the Russian statistical agency as the 
standard since June 2000. The monthly cost of the staples basket by region is used as a price 
representative. Table 1 reports the composition of the basket.  
 
Table 1. Composition of the staples basket. 
 
Good Unit of measure Quantity 
Bread, white and rye-wheat kg 9.583 
White bread kg 6.250 
Wheat flour kg 1.667 
Rice kg 0.417 
Millet kg 0.500 
Peas and beans kg 0.608 
Vermicelli kg 0.500 
Potatoes kg 12.500 
White cabbages kg 2.917 
Cucumbers kg 0.150 
Carrots kg 2.917 
Onions kg 1.667 
Apples kg 1.550 
Sugar kg 1.667 
Candies kg 0.058 
Cookies kg 0.058 
Beef kg 1.250 
Mutton kg 0.150 
Pork kg 0.333 
Chicken kg 1.167 
Frozen fish kg 1.167 
Salted herring and the like kg 0.058 
Milk litre 9.167 
Sour cream kg 0.150 
Butter kg 0.150 
Cottage cheese kg 0.833 
Cheese kg 0.208 
Eggs piece 15 
Margarine kg 0.500 
Sunflower oil  kg 0.583 
Salt kg 0.304 
Black tea kg 0.042 
Black pepper kg 0.061 
Source: Rosstat (2006, p. 161) 
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The price data cover January 2001 to December 2019 (228 time observations); their 
source is EMISS (2020a). Quantities in the staples basket are uniform across regions and 
invariant in time. This makes the cost of the basket to be comparable across regions and over 
time.3 A similar basket (of 25 foods, though) was also used, e.g., by Berkowitz & DeJong 
(2001, 2005) for analyzing marker integration in Russia in the 1990s. 
Figure 1 reports summary statistics – the mean tP  and standard deviation t – of the 
price differentials over the time span under consideration. As the sign of the price differential 
depends on the (arbitrary) order of regions in their pair, the summary statistics are computed 
with the absolute values of the price differentials:    11 1)1( 2 Nr N rs rstt PNNP  , 
2/121
1 1 )()1(
2 


     tNr N rs rstt PPNN .  
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Figure 1. Summary statistics of absolute price differentials. 
 
The statistics depicted in Figure 1 give an idea of price dispersion in the Russian 
                                                          
3 This is not the case for a different kind of aggregated good, namely, baskets for computing 
regional consumer price indices (CPI), that are  employed by some authors for analyzing the 
law of one price (to name a few, Cecchetti et al., 2002, use CPIs across U.S. cities, Liu et al., 
2018, use CPIs across Chinese provinces, and Das & Bhattacharta, 2008, use CPIs across 
Indian cities). The point is that the CPI weighting schemes may vary across regions (so 
making commodity baskets to be region-specific) and change from time to time (e.g., the 
weights in the Russian regional CPIs change yearly). 
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spatial market. As it is seen, the price dispersion is highly volatile with dramatic fluctuations; 
the maximum to minimum ratio equals almost 1.5 for both mean and standard deviation. This 
was due to relatively high inflation that greatly varied across regions. In December 2019, the 
national average cost of the staples basket became 418.7% higher than in January 2001; the 
rise in the regional costs ranged from 227.5% to 437.6%. Over time, the mean of the absolute 
price differential tends to increase, while its standard deviation tends to decrease. Assuming a 
linear trend, the former rises by 0.48% per year, and the latter falls by 0.60% per year.  
Price distributions give one more summary view on the data. Figure 2 shows 
distribution of the basket cost relative to the national average (prt/p0t, where 0 stands for Russia 
as a whole) for the initial and final years of the time span under consideration. The costs are 
the averages over the respective years. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of the cost of staples basket. 
 
Both realizations of the distribution evidence the absence of convergence clubs. A test 
for multimodality (Fischer, Mammen & Marron, 1994) corroborates this impression, rejecting 
the hypothesis of more than one mode with confidence for every out of 19 years. The right-
hand tail of the distribution – starting from relative price 1.3 – is due to some regions from the 
Russian Far East (the rightmost histogram bar represents the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, 
the most remote region of the country). Isolated histogram bars in this part of the distribution 
are a kind of outliers rather than modes.  
Comparing 2001 and 2019, the change in the shape of the price distribution is 
moderate; the mean increases from 1.025 to 1.051, while the standard deviation decreases 
from 0.261 to 0.247 (note that these statistics relate to prices themselves, and not to price 
differentials as in Figure 1). The largest change occurred among the ‘cheapest’ regions (with 
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the relative price below 0.9): 7 regions left this group. However, the neighborhood of the 
national average, 0.9–1.1 changed only slightly, increased by one region. The most increase, 4 
regions, occurred in the group 1.1–1.2. Hence, a prevailing tendency was that of rise in 
relative prices. Some decline in relative prices took place as well, though, e.g., the most 
expensive region, Chukotka, shifted by two positions in the direction of lower prices. Thus, it 
is possible that price convergence and divergence take place in some spatial parts of the 
Russian market. This makes analyzing only the state of integration with Models (1) and (2) 
insufficient, which motivates the use of modelling transitional processes.   
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Before presenting the full results, it is instructive to look at examples of specific region pairs 
belonging to each of four groups: perfectly integrated, conditionally integrated, tending 
towards integration, and non-integrated. Figure 3 illustrates these, depicting the actual 
evolutions of the price differential vs. their theoretical long-run paths.  
Figure 3 clarifies econometric considerations from the second section. Figure 3(a) relates 
to regions that are perfectly integrated with each other. Model (1) holds for this pair; the price 
differential fluctuates around the price parity. Deviations from the parity have the half-life time  = 
11.2 months. Figure 3(b) shows a conditionally integrated pair that satisfies Model (2). Here, the 
price differential fluctuates around constant disparity of 11.2% (in real terms) with  = 6.9 months. 
Regions in Figure 3(c) are moving towards integration with each other. This pair satisfies Model 
(3c) with C(t) = 0.321/(1 + 0.012t). The price differential fluctuates around this long-run path 
with  = 4.2 months and diminishes, halving deterministically every 6 years ( = 71.9 months).   
The lower panel of Figure 3 illustrates two cases of non-integration. No one model 
describes the behaviour of the price differential in Figure 3(d); it has no long-run path, being a 
random walk. Non-integration of the region pair in Figure 3(e) is due to deterministic price 
divergence. Model (3a) with C(t) = 0.072e0.002t describes the long-run behaviour of the price 
differential. The differential fluctuates around this rising trend with  = 2.7 months; its 
deterministic part doubles every 26 years (314.4 months). Albeit there are more impressive 
examples of price divergence, the region pair in Figure 3(e) is selected to show the case of 
non-transitivity. This pair involves the same regions as in Figures 3(a) and 3(b), being the 
difference of region pairs in these figures. Then, seemingly, it would have to satisfy Model 
(2); however, it does not, actually obeying to Model (3) with a diverging trend.   
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(a) Perfect integration: 
St. Petersburg City – Leningrad Oblast 
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(c) The movement towards integration (convergence): 
Tyumen Oblast – Novosibirsk Oblast 
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(d) Non-integration with random walking: 
Omsk Oblast – Altai Krai 
(e) Non-integration with divergence: 
Leningrad Oblast – Novgorod Oblast 
 Figure 3. Examples of different types of region pairs. 
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Table 2 tabulates the results of the analysis across all region pairs in a summarized form 
 
Table 2. Results of the analysis: the pattern of Russia’s market integration, %. 
 
Region Perfect-
integration 
rate  
Conditional-
integration rate 
Convergence 
rate  
Non-integration 
/ Divergence 
rate 
European part of Russia     
1. Rep. of Karelia 16.7 28.2 3.8 51.3 / 9.0 
2. Rep. of Komi  14.1 37.2 2.6 46.2 / 2.6 
3. Arkhangelsk Obl. 12.8 11.5 2.6 73.1 / 12.8 
4. Vologda Obl. 16.7 26.9 2.6 53.8 / 1.3 
5. Murmansk Obl. 11.5 28.2 2.6 57.7 / 5.1 
6. St. Petersburg City 10.3 15.4 2.6 71.8 / 19.2 
7. Leningrad Obl. 15.4 25.6 1.3 57.7 / 28.2 
8. Novgorod Obl. 23.1 23.1 5.1 48.7 / 10.3 
9. Pskov Obl. 20.5 7.7 2.6 69.2 / 6.4 
10. Kaliningrad Obl. 15.4 35.9 0.0 48.7 / 7.7 
11. Bryansk Obl. 25.6 12.8 3.8 57.7 / 1.3 
12. Vladimir Obl. 28.2 17.9 1.3 52.6 / 2.6 
13. Ivanovo Obl. 21.8 16.7 2.6 59.0 / 3.8 
14. Kaluga Obl. 15.4 7.7 3.8 73.1 / 1.3 
15. Kostroma Obl. 35.9 29.5 1.3 33.3 / 6.4 
16. Moscow City 11.5 10.3 1.3 76.9 / 3.8 
17. Moscow Obl. 25.6 21.8 1.3 51.3 / 2.6 
18. Oryol Obl. 32.1 24.4 1.3 42.3 / 2.6 
19. Ryazan Obl. 30.8 30.8 0.0 38.5 / 14.1 
20. Smolensk Obl. 17.9 24.4 1.3 56.4 / 3.8 
21. Tver Obl. 21.8 30.8 0.0 47.4 / 5.1 
22. Tula Obl. 23.1 14.1 1.3 61.5 / 1.3 
23. Yaroslavl Obl. 23.1 24.4 6.4 46.2 / 9.0 
24. Rep. of Mariy El  26.9 39.7 0.0 33.3 / 2.6 
25. Rep. of Mordovia 16.7 19.2 0.0 64.1 / 32.1 
26. Chuvash Rep.  19.2 44.9 3.8 32.1 / 6.4 
27. Kirov Obl. 24.4 21.8 1.3 52.6 / 20.5 
28. Nizhni Novgorod Obl. 25.6 33.3 1.3 39.7 / 6.4 
29. Belgorod Obl. 19.2 33.3 0.0 47.4 / 24.4 
30. Voronezh Obl. 38.5 39.7 0.0 21.8 / 6.4 
31. Kursk Obl. 10.3 5.1 0.0 84.6 / 10.3 
32. Lipetsk Obl. 10.3 32.1 0.0 57.7 / 14.1 
33. Tambov Obl. 16.7 34.6 2.6 46.2 / 0.0 
34. Rep. of Kalmykia  15.4 6.4 6.4 71.8 / 0.0 
35. Rep. of Tatarstan  17.9 20.5 2.6 59.0 / 3.8 
36. Astrakhan Obl. 15.4 15.4 3.8 65.4 / 5.1 
37. Volgograd Obl. 23.1 16.7 0.0 60.3 / 7.7 
38. Penza Obl. 16.7 25.6 0.0 57.7 / 14.1 
39. Samara Obl. 25.6 10.3 7.7 56.4 / 6.4 
40. Saratov Obl. 12.8 9.0 0.0 78.2 / 10.3 
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Region Perfect-
integration 
rate  
Conditional-
integration rate 
Convergence 
rate  
Non-integration 
/ Divergence 
rate 
41. Ulyanovsk Obl. 21.8 17.9 2.6 57.7 / 1.3 
42. Rep. of Adygeya  20.5 11.5 1.3 66.7 / 1.3 
43. Rep. of Dagestan 20.5 7.7 5.1 66.7 / 1.3 
44. Rep. of Ingushetia 57.7 17.9 1.3 23.1 / 9.0 
45. Kabardian-Balkar Rep.  26.9 26.9 3.8 42.3 / 5.1 
46. Karachaev-Cirkassian Rep. 24.4 23.1 3.8 48.7 / 1.3 
47. Rep. of Northern Ossetia 16.7 17.9 2.6 62.8 / 1.3 
48. Krasnodar Krai 20.5 19.2 1.3 59.0 / 12.8 
49. Stavropol Krai 25.6 14.1 1.3 59.0 / 0.0 
50. Rostov Obl. 25.6 20.5 1.3 52.6 / 1.3 
51. Rep. of Bashkortostan  26.9 33.3 6.4 33.3 / 5.1 
52. Udmurt Rep.  29.5 34.6 0.0 35.9 / 5.1 
53. Kurgan Obl. 25.6 29.5 9.0 35.9 / 9.0 
54. Orenburg Obl. 21.8 39.7 0.0 38.5 / 1.3 
55. Perm Krai 26.9 29.5 0.0 43.6 / 7.7 
56. Sverdlovsk Obl. 21.8 28.2 5.1 44.9 / 9.0 
57. Chelyabinsk Obl. 37.2 33.3 0.0 29.5 / 6.4 
Asian part of Russia     
Siberia     
58. Rep. of Altai 17.9 14.1 1.3 66.7 / 6.4 
59. Altai Krai 34.6 20.5 7.7 37.2 / 2.6 
60. Kemerovo Obl. 35.9 38.5 2.6 23.1 / 3.8 
61. Novosibirsk Obl. 15.4 25.6 1.3 57.7 / 7.7 
62. Omsk Obl. 29.5 44.9 0.0 25.6 / 2.6 
63. Tomsk Obl. 24.4 47.4 1.3 26.9 / 6.4 
64. Tyumen Obl. 10.3 29.5 20.5 39.7 / 2.6 
65. Rep. of Buryatia 33.3 35.9 3.8 26.9 / 1.3 
66. Rep. of Tuva  39.7 21.8 2.6 35.9 / 2.6 
67. Rep. of Khakasia  19.2 41.0 1.3 38.5 / 3.8 
68. Krasnoyarsk Krai 16.7 34.6 3.8 44.9 / 6.4 
69. Irkutsk Obl. 34.6 51.3 3.8 10.3 / 1.3 
70. Transbaikal Krai 21.8 55.1 3.8 19.2 / 9.0 
Russian Far East     
61. Rep. of Sakha (Yakutia)  0.0 73.1 1.3 25.6 / 19.2 
72. Jewish Autonomous Obl. 9.0 73.1 2.6 15.4 / 3.8 
73. Chukotka AO 0.0 64.1 21.8 14.1 / 0.0 
74. Primorsky Krai 3.8 26.9 1.3 67.9 / 5.1 
75. Khabarovsk Krai 1.3 55.1 1.3 42.3 / 14.1 
76. Amur Obl. 19.2 42.3 3.8 34.6 / 5.1 
77. Kamchatka Krai 1.3 26.9 42.3 29.5 / 0.0 
78. Magadan Obl. 1.3 64.1 0.0 34.6 / 23.1 
79. Sakhalin Obl. 0.0 24.4 5.1 70.5 / 0.0 
Total 20.5 28.2 3.3 48.0 / 6.8 
Notes: Obl. stands for Oblast, Rep. stands for Republic, and AO stands for Autonomous Okrug. 
Percentages may not sum up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
 17
. For each region, Table 2 reports the percentages of the rest 78 regions with which this 
region is perfectly integrated, conditionally integrated, tending towards integration, and not 
integrated (referred to as respective rates). The non-integration rate is the total percentage of 
randomly walking and diverging regions; the percentage of the latter is also reported. The last 
line in the table reports the total percentages of region pairs (among all 3081 pairs); 
alternatively, they represent averages over all regions. 
Among all region pairs, 48.7% are perfectly or conditionally integrated. Adding pairs 
tending towards integration, we get the total of 52.0%. Comparison of the first figure with 
results reported by Yazgan & Yilmazkuday (2011, Table 1) suggests that the degree of 
product market integration in Russia can be deemed fairly satisfactory, being comparable with 
that in the U.S. These authors analyze the law of one price across 1326 pairs of U.S. cities, 
applying a model of the form (2). In our terms, this means both perfect and conditional 
integration. They use seven unit root tests. Across these, the percentage of stationary price 
differentials for non-perishable goods is found to be 60% to 87.2% at the 10% significance 
level. Obviously, if the condition of simultaneously rejecting the unit root hypothesis by all 
tests were imposed (as it is done here), the resulting percentage would be surely less than 60%. 
On the other hand, as it is noted in the second section, the analysis performed bases on fairly 
‘tough’ methods of unit root testing. Be ‘softer’ methods applied (even with the agreed-upon 
rejection of unit roots by the both tests), the share of perfectly and conditionally integrated 
region pairs in Russia would be found to equal 73.0% (see Table 8 in the fifth section).  
Given long distances between many regions of Russia, price disparities should contain 
significant contributions of transportation costs. Hence, it is reasonable to expect conditional 
integration to prevail. This is, indeed, the case; the number of conditionally integrated region 
pairs is greater by the factor of circa 1.4 than the number of perfectly integrated ones. Figure 4 
plots distributions of perfect-integration rates as well as the total of perfect- and conditional-
integration rates.  
The leftmost histogram bar in Figure 4(a) suggests that 8.9% of regions (7 regions out 
of 78) are perfectly integrated with less than 5% of other regions. Among them, three regions 
are perfectly integrated with none other region. The most frequent case is perfect integration 
with 15% to 20% of other regions; there are 25.3% of such cases. No one region is perfectly 
integrated with more that 60% (exactly, 57.7%) of other regions. Turning to the sum of 
perfectly and conditionally integrated regions, Figure 4(b), the ‘worst’ case is integration with 
15% to 20% of other regions. Hence, there are no regions without conditional integration with 
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other regions. The maximum is integration with 85.9% of regions. (Note that each region is 
herein taken twice, in pairs (r, s) and (s, r); that is why this value exceeds the total percentage 
of perfectly and conditionally integrated pairs in Table 2.) The most frequent case, 15.2%, is 
perfect and conditional integration with 35% to 40% of other regions. Specific regions that 
determine the leftmost and rightmost bars in these and next histograms will be specified 
below. 
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Figure 4. Distributions of the integration rates. 
 
Processes of price convergence, i.e. the movement towards integration, do take place in 
the Russian market. However, they are rather rare, occurring only in 3.3% of all region pairs. 
Figure 5 plots the distribution of convergence rate. Most of cases concentrate in the interval of 
0% to 5%, making up 83.5%. Out of them, 22.8% of regions do not move towards integration 
with other regions, and 27.8% of regions converge with a sole region.  
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Figure 5. Distribution of convergence rate. 
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Figure 6(a) plots the distribution of non-integration rate (including divergence). It 
evidences that in the best case, a region is not integrated with 9 other regions (10.3%). The 
range of non-integration rate is very wide, amounting to 84.6%. The most frequent case, 
16.5%, is non-integration with 55% to 60% of other regions. 
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Figure 6. Distributions of non-integration and divergence rates. 
 
An unpleasant aspect of non-integration is a significant proportion of price divergence, 
more than twice as much as that of convergence. Among all non-integrated region pairs, the 
proportion of diverging ones is 14.1%. Figure 6(b) plots the distribution of divergence rate. 
Only six regions diverge with no one other. Although, only two regions diverge with more than 
25% of other ones. However, price divergence not always is a negative phenomenon. Imagine 
that the price paths in two regions are parallel. If the price in some third region catches up with 
one of them, then it inevitably diverges from the price in other region.       
Figure 7 relates the results obtained to geography, mapping regional extents of 
integration, that is, the total percentage (as a range) of regions with which a given region is 
perfectly and conditionally integrated and tends towards integration. This indicator is reverse 
to the non-integration rate, equalling 100% minus non-integration rate.   
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Figure 7. Geography of market integration in Russia: extent of integration by country’s region. 
Notes: See Table 2 for numerical designations of regions. Not numbered region (between 43 and 44) is the (out-of-sample) Chechen 
Republic. 
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Taking a look at the map, some unexpected features are seen. Given much shorter distances 
and more developed transport infrastructure in the European part of Russia than in its Asian part, 
one would a priory expect the former to be more strongly integrated than the latter. However, a 
significant number of poorly integrated regions are present in the European part. Except for the 
northern Arkhangelsk Oblast (region 3), the rest cases can be hardly explained by geographical 
reasons. At the same time, integration in Siberia is fairly strong. There is a sole region with the 
integration rate below 40% (the Republic of Altai, region 58). As the entire matrix of region pairs is 
very cumbersome, let us divide it into three aggregated blocks: pairs within European Russia, pairs 
within Asian Russia, and pairs ‘between’, i.e. with one region from European Russia and second 
from Asian Russia. There are 57 regions in European Russia (1596 pairs) with average distance 
between them equalling 1.4 thousand km; Asian Russia consists of 22 regions (231 pairs) with 
average distance of 4.2 thousand km. The average distance between regions belonging to European 
and Asian Russia (1254 pairs) equals to 6.3 thousand km. Table 3 presents the results by block. 
 
Table 3. The pattern of Russia’s market integration by spatial block, %. 
 
Block of region pairs Perfect-
integration 
rate  
Conditional-
integration 
rate  
Convergence 
rate  
Non-integration 
/ Divergence 
rate 
Within European Russia 23.6 16.0 1.2 51.7 / 7.5 
Within Asian Russia 13.9 42.0 9.5 30.7 / 3.9 
Between European and Asian Russia 17.9 41.1 4.8 29.7 / 6.5 
  
From the geographical viewpoint, the correlation of perfect and conditional integration looks 
quite expectable: in European Russia, with its shorter distances, perfect integration prevails, while 
conditional integration prevails in Asian Russia and between European and Asian Russia, reflecting 
longer distances. However, the geography cannot explain greater non-integration rate in European 
Russia as well as lesser convergence rate, accompanied by greater divergence rate. 
Further analysis of the results obtained can shed some light on this issue. At first, the role of 
different factors in conditional integration is to be analyzed. Consider a simple model of pricing. Let 
s be a region of origin of a good, and p(w)s be the wholesale price of the good there. With markup 
(retail margin) ms, the retail price of the good in s is p(w)s(1 + ms). In region r, the retail price is 
p(w)s(1 + rs)(1 + mr), where rs is the cost of transportation from s to r in percentage terms, (1 + 
rs)(1 + mr) – 1 representing the distribution share (Yilmazkuday, 2018). Herefrom, the price 
differential takes the form Prs = log(1 + rs) + log((1 + mr)/(1 + ms))  (Lrs) + Mrs, a sum of some 
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function of log distance, Lrs, and the markup differential. The markups can accumulate a 
considerable part of the effects of ‘artificial’ impediments to integration, such as regional 
protectionism, local price regulations, organized crime, etc. Gluschenko (2010) found the 
contribution of such factors to interregional price dispersion to be fairly significant in 1992–2000. 
Regional protectionism still poses a problem in Russia, as the Federal Antimonopoly Service of 
Russia documents in its annual reports (e.g., FAS Russia, 2020). Gousev (2016) considers this issue 
in detail concerning Russian retail trade. However, the markups not fully capture the effect of 
regional protectionism. For instance, it can prevent the use of arbitrage opportunities, forcing 
retailers to buy goods from local producers, despite p(w)r > p(w)s(1 + rs), which the above model does 
not describe. Differences in wages and rents across regions are also responsible in part for the 
dispersion of markups. In turn, this is due to imperfection of associated markets, labor market and 
real estate market.4 (For example, high wages and rents in Moscow City is one of reasons for its 
weak integration with the rest of Russia.)  
There are only rough proxies of the transportation costs and markups. Data on markups by 
region are available only for 2016–2019 (EMISS, 2020b). Therefore, the averages over these years 
are used to compute Mrs. The markups are those for socially-significant foods. Although a list of 
these foods is not provided in the data source, all they for sure have to be present in the staples 
basket. As regards the transportation costs, a linear function of log distance proxy them. The 
dependent variable is the estimate of time-invariant price differential rsrsrsrst CP  ˆ/ˆ   in 
Model (2). (Therefore, we may assume the markups to be approximately stable as well and use their 
static proxies.) The cross-sectional model to be estimated has the form: 
Crs = 0 + 1Lrs + 2Mrs + rs, (r, s)  {conditionally-integrated pairs of regions}. (4) 
Table 4 presents the estimation results. The estimations are run for the whole set of 
conditionally-integrated pairs and by spatial block; N denotes the number of observations in a 
respective sample. The standard errors reported are the White heteroscedasticity-consistent errors. 
As the estimates are not comparable across samples, the contributions of independent variables to 
the dependent variable give the idea of their roles. Since MLC 210 ˆˆˆ   , the contribution of 
distance is CL /)ˆˆ( 10    (taking into account that 0 is a scale factor depending on the units of 
measure of distance), and the contribution of the markup differential is CM /ˆ2 . 
                                                          
4 A reservation should be made that this is not always the case. In northern regions, higher wages are 
due to compensating wage differentials that compensate unfavorable natural conditions in these 
territories. 
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Table 4. Results of estimation of Equation (4). 
 
Variable Coefficient  Standard error P-value  Contribution, %
Russia as a whole (N = 869) 
Constant –1.051 0.056 0.000  
Distance 0.160 0.007 0.000 92.6 
Markup differential 1.059 0.195 0.000 7.4 
Within European Russia (N = 256) 
Constant –0.158 0.047 0.001  
Distance 0.041 0.007 0.000 90.0 
Markup differential 0.723 0.144 0.000 10.0 
Within Asian Russia (N = 97) 
Constant –1.183 0.190 0.000  
Distance 0.183 0.023 0.000 96.0 
Markup differential 1.237 0.705 0.082 4.0 
Between European and Asian Russia (N = 516)  
Constant –2.452 0.131 0.000  
Distance 0.317 0.015 0.000 90.9 
Markup differential 1.469 0.244 0.000 9.1 
           
The results suggest that albeit the role of the ‘natural’ impediment to integration, the 
distance, is predominant, it is not exhaustive (which justifies the term ‘conditional integration’). The 
most pronounced influence of other impediments captured by the markup differential is within 
European Russia, where it contributes 10% to the average price differential. Contrastingly, its 
contribution within Asian Russia is 2.5 times lesser, despite this part of the country includes the 
majority of northern regions where the wage compensation differentials are applied. Comparing the 
results for the whole of Russia with those for pairs with European and Asian regions, we may 
conclude that the difference between markups in European and Asian Russia plays a greater role 
there than in the whole country. By and large the results from Table 4 give grounds to suppose that 
‘artificial’ impediments to integration are more abundant in European Russia, causing its weaker 
integration.   
In what follows, the analysis exploits probit models. Denote Prob() the probability, () 
standard normal distribution, and  and x vectors of coefficients and variables. Dependent variable y 
possesses the value 1 on a certain set of region pairs and equals 0 on some alternative set of pairs. 
Then the model has the following general form: 
Prob(y = 1) = (x).          (5) 
The marginal effects of variables are ααxxx ˆ)ˆ()/1Prob(  y , where () is the standard normal 
density. Tables 5 and 6 report the marginal effects computed as the averages of individual effects 
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over all N1 + N0 observations; N1 and N0 denote the numbers of observations with yrs = 1 and yrs = 0, 
respectively. The standard errors reported are the Huber/White errors.   
Let us consider, in addition to the previous results, whether distances and markups prevent 
integration to be perfect. Then yrs = 1 if Prst satisfies Model (1), and yrs = 0 if Prst satisfies Model (2). 
Table 5 reports the results of estimating the respective probit model that has the form:   
Prob(yrs = 1) = (0 + 1Lrs + 2Mrs),  
(r, s)  {perfectly integrated pairs}  {conditionally integrated pairs}.   (5a) 
 
Table 5. Perfect vs. conditional integration 
 
Variable Coefficient  Standard error P-value  Marginal effect
Russia as a whole (N1 = 633, N0 = 869) Constant 4.072 0.293 0.000  
Distance –0.513 0.037 0.000 –0.181 
Markup differential –4.237 1.489 0.004 –1.445 
Within European Russia (N1 = 377, N0 = 256) Constant 2.556 0.551 0.000  
Distance –0.305 0.077 0.000 –0.115 
Markup differential –7.014 2.401 0.003 –2.633 
Within Asian Russia (N1 = 32, N0 = 97) Constant 4.440 1.207 0.000  
Distance –0.656 0.148 0.000 –0.173 
Markup differential 1.518 7.899 0.848 0.401 
Between European and Asian Russia (N1 = 224, N0 = 516)  Constant 7.026 0.797 0.000  
Distance –0.878 0.094 0.000 –0.270 
Markup differential –2.571 1.952 0.188 –0.790 
            
The results in Table 5 suggest that the greater the distance and difference in markups 
between regions in the pair, the lesser probability of perfect integration, as both variables have the 
negative sign. An exception is Asia Russia with a positive coefficient of the markup differential; 
however, this estimate is surely insignificant. This implies a predominant role of distance in time-
invariant price differentials in Asian Russia, which corroborates a result from Table 4 regarding a 
small contribution of the markup differential (4%) here. As for other spatial blocks, an interesting 
result is that the marginal effect of the markup differential is much stronger than that of distance. 
For instance, an infinitesimal rise in distance lowers the probability of perfect integration by 11.5%, 
while such rise in markup differential lowers it by 263.3%. (The role of the markup differential may 
seem questionable in ‘mixed’ pairs because of relatively high p-value of its estimate.) By and large, 
the results from Tables 4 and 5 are in good agreement with economic and geographical 
 25
considerations.  
Let us turn to non-integration. The markup differential is not applicable for analysis of its 
reasons. It may be that it is the dynamics of the price differential that causes random walk or 
deterministic divergence. However, static proxy Mrs (as well as a static model at all) cannot capture 
this effect. Thus, only distance remains as an explanatory variable. Based on theoretical 
considerations (e.g., Fackler & Goodwin, 2001), one can expect that the longer distance between 
regions, the more likely loosening price transmission between them (the more so if the good passes  
through a trading network of regions). As the distance increases, the dynamics of prices in a region 
pair eventually becomes independent, generating a random walk of their price differential or, maybe, 
divergence of prices. Hence, the probability of random walk and divergence should rise with 
increase in distance. The model used takes the following form: 
Prob(yrs = 1) = (0 + 1Lrs).        (5b) 
Table 6 reports results for random walks: yrs = 1 if Prst is a random walk, and yrs = 0 if Prst 
satisfies Model (1) or (2). 
 
Table 6. Random walks vs. perfect and conditional integration  
 
Variable Coefficient  Standard error P-value  Marginal effect
Russia as a whole (N1 = 1269, N0 = 1502) Constant 1.473 0.196 0.000  
Distance –0.204 0.025 0.000 –0.079 
Within European Russia (N1 = 825, N0 = 633) Constant –0.890 0.366 0.015  
Distance 0.149 0.052 0.004 0.058 
Within Asian Russia (N1 = 71, N0 = 129) Constant 0.372 0.838 0.657 –0.035 
Distance –0.093 0.104 0.372  
Between European and Asian Russia (N1 = 373, N0 = 740)  Constant 0.223 0.588 0.704 –0.076 
Distance –0.076 0.068 0.269  
           
We can accept the hypothesis that longer distances are associated with random walking for 
European Russia only. Here, an infinitesimal change of distance increases the probability that a 
random walk takes place by 5.8%. For Asian Russia and the ‘mixed’ pairs, Model (5b) is 
inappropriate, having high p-values of both estimates and the model statistic (log-likelihood ratio). 
Nonetheless, the model works for the whole of country, but yields a paradoxical result: an 
infinitesimal change of distance lowers the probability of random walking by 7.9%. Indeed, the 
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average distance in region pairs with random walks is shorter than the average distance in integrated 
pairs everywhere except for European Russia.  
Results of a similar analysis of divergence with yrs = 1 if Prst satisfies Model (3) with a 
‘wrong’ sign of , and yrs = 0 otherwise are tabulated in Table 7. (Different alternative sets of region 
pairs have been tried as well, yielding qualitatively similar results.)  
   
Table 7. Divergence vs. the rest.  
 
Variable Coefficient  Standard error P-value  Marginal effect
Russia as a whole (N1 = 209, N0 = 2872) Constant –1.652 0.282 0.000  
Distance 0.021 0.036 0.571 0.003 
Within European Russia (N1 = 119, N0 = 1477) Constant –2.172 0.563 0.000  
Distance 0.103 0.079 0.193 0.014 
Within Asian Russia (N1 = 9, N0 = 222) Constant –1.292 1.202 0.283 –0.005 
Distance –0.059 0.150 0.694  
Between European and Asian Russia (N1 = 81, N0 = 1254)  Constant –3.770 0.886 0.000 0.032 
Distance 0.260 0.102 0.011  
           
 These results are also rather poor. The validity of Model (5b) can be accepted only for pairs 
with regions from European and Asian Russia. The marginal effect of distance is minor, suggesting 
a 3.2% rise in probability of divergence with an infinitesimal increase in distance.   
Thus, it can be concluded that geography explains the pattern of non-integration only 
partially. The mains reasons for non-integration seem idiosyncratic features of regional markets. The 
analysis performed is not able to reveal them; however, it may be suspected that regional 
protectionism significantly contributes to non-integration.  
At last, let us take a look at concrete regions that are in opposite ends of the ‘integration 
spectrum’. Table 8 lists the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ regions (which rank first to fifth from the top and 
bottom, respectively) with respect to different indicators of market integration. Values are expressed 
as the percentage of 78 regions. 
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Table 8. Ranking of regions by different indicators of market integration, %. 
 
Panel A    
The most perfectly-integrated 
region 
Perfect-
integration 
rate 
The least perfectly-integrated 
region 
Perfect-
integration 
rate 
Rep. of Ingushetia (44) 57.7 Rep. of Sakha (Yakutia) (61),  
Chukotka A.O. (73), Sakhalin 
Obl. (79) 
0 
Rep. of Tuva (66) 39.7 Khabarovsk Krai (75), 
Kamchatka Krai (77), Magadan 
Obl. (78) 
1.3 
Voronezh Obl. (30) 38.5 Primorsky Krai (74)  3.8 
Chelyabinsk Obl. (57) 37.2 Jewish Autonomous Obl. (72) 9.0 
Kostroma Obl. (15), Kemerovo 
Obl. (60) 
35.9 St. Petersburg City (6), Kursk 
Obl. (31), Lipetsk Obl. (32), 
Tyumen Obl. (64) 
10.3 
Panel B    
The most perfectly-and-
conditionally integrated region 
Integration 
rate 
The least perfectly-and-
conditionally integrated region 
Integration 
rate 
Irkutsk Obl. (69) 85.9 Kursk Obl. (31) 15.4 
Jewish Autonomous Obl. (72) 82.1 Moscow City (16), Rep. of 
Kalmykia (34), Saratov Obl. 
(40) 
21.8 
Voronezh Obl. (30) 78.2 Kaluga Obl. (14) 23.4 
Transbaikal Krai (70) 76.9 Arkhangelsk Obl. (3), 
Sakhalin Obl. (79) 
24.4 
Rep. of Ingushetia (44) 75.6 St. Petersburg City (6) 25.6 
Panel C    
Region with the greatest extent 
of integration  
Extent of 
integration 
Region with the least extent of 
integration 
Extent of 
integration 
Irkutsk Obl. (69) 89.7 Kursk Obl. (31) 15.4 
Chukotka A.O. 85.9 Saratov Obl. (40) 21.8 
Jewish Autonomous Obl. (72) 84.6 Moscow City (16) 23.1 
Transbaikal Krai (70) 80.8 Kaluga Obl. (75), Arkhangelsk 
Obl. (3) 
26.9 
Voronezh Obl. (30) 78.2 St. Petersburg City (6), Rep. of 
Kalmykia (34) 
28.2 
Notes: Numerical designations of regions are in parentheses. Obl. stands for Oblast, Rep. stands for 
Republic, and A.O. stands for Autonomous Okrug. 
 
The data in panel A of Table 8 look fairly reasonable from the geographical viewpoint. 
Regarding its left part, the most perfectly-integrated regions are from the European Russia, except 
for the Republic of Tuva and Kemerovo Oblast from Siberia. The rightmost histogram bar in Figure 
4(a) is due to Ingushetia; the next five regions form the preceding nonzero bar. As for the least 
perfectly-integrated regions, all regions ranked from first to fourth are remote Far Eastern regions. 
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Therefore, perfect integration can rarely occur there. It is these eight regions (out of all ten 
constituting the Russian Far East) that form the leftmost and next histogram bars in Figure 4(a). 
However, only one region among regions ranked as fifth is from Siberia, the rest three are from the 
European Russia.    
Regions in the left part of panel B of Table 8 form three rightmost histogram bars in Figure 
4(b). More than a half of regions (three out of five) that are perfectly or conditionally integrated with 
the most number of other regions are from Asian Russia. Turning to the right part of this panel, there 
is a sole Far Eastern region (the Sakhalin Oblast). Rest seven regions here are from European 
Russia, among them the ‘worst’ in Russia, the Kursk Oblast (the leftmost histogram bar in Figure 
4(b) is due solely to it). The presence of the Archangelsk Oblast, a northern remote region of 
European Russia, among poorly integrated regions is explainable. As for the Moscow City, the 
reason for its poor integration is clear, as the Moscow market is known for many and varied 
impediments to access to it, at least in the early 2000s.   
Panel C of Table 8 differs from Panel B in that the convergence rate is added. Since the cases 
of the movement towards integration are not widespread in the pattern obtained, the lists in these 
two panels overlap heavily. Chukotka, because of its high convergence rate, replaces the Republic of 
Ingushetia in the left part of Panel C as compared to panel B. This region and the Tyumen Oblast 
form the last but one nonzero histogram bar in Figure 5 (the last one is due to the Kamchatka Krai). 
The ‘worst’ regions in the right part of Panel C of Table 8 are the same as in Panel B, except for the 
Sakhalin Oblast which leaves the list because of convergence with 5.1% of other regions. No one 
case of price convergence with other regions is observed in the Kursk and Saratov oblasts. The rest 
regions converge to 1 to 3 other regions; only the Republic of Kalmykia moves towards integration 
with 5 regions. Contrastingly, price divergence is widespread among these regions; four of them 
diverge with 10.3% to 19.2% of other regions. 
In general, the above considerations confirm the results of the regression analysis, suggesting 
that distance is not a main reason for non-integration. Idiosyncratic features of regional markets 
seem to prevail in the European part of the country.  
 
2001–2019 VS. 1994–2000 
As it is mentioned in the introduction, Gluschenko (2011) analyzes market integration in Russia 
over 1994–2000 relative to a benchmark region, choosing the ‘best’ benchmark among all possible 
ones. Thus, he previously obtains a comprehensive pattern of integration, Gluschenko (2011, Table 
A2) reporting it. It would be interesting to compare that pattern with the pattern for 2001–2019. 
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However, these two analyses are not fully comparable. 
First, they differ in the data used. For 1994–2000, the cost of a staples basket consisting of 
25 foods has been analyzed, while the 33-food basket is used here. The difference is not only the 
number of goods, but also their quantities across the baskets; see Gluschenko (2009) for comparison 
of these baskets. Besides, the price data for 1994–2000 are those collected in the capital cities of 
regions, whereas the data for 2001–2019 are the regional averages. At last, the 1994–2000 analysis 
covers 75 regions (2775 region pairs); it does not include the Moscow and Leningrad oblasts, 
Ingushetia, and Chukotka. 
Second, the analyses differ in methodology. The analysis for 1994–2000 exploits the 
general-to-specific approach and classes conditionally integrated region pairs as non-integrated 
(since the most part of price disparities in that time were so great that surely could not be assigned to 
transportation costs). Besides, different methods of testing for unit roots are applied in Gluschenko 
(2011); the difference is pointed out in the second section. Those methods make it possible to reject 
unit roots more frequently than the methods exploited in this study.  
While the difference in the data is irremovable, the results of both analyses can be made 
methodologically compatible. On the one hand, benefiting from unpublished intermediate results of 
the 1994–2000 analysis, it is possible to distinguish conditionally integrated region pairs and restore 
results corresponding to the specific-to-general approach. On the other hand, results for 2001–2019 
can be reestimated with the use of the same methods of unit root testing as in Gluschenko (2011).  
Table 9 reports so obtained methodologically compatible results, comparing summarized patterns 
for 1994–2000 and 2001–2019 within the framework of both specific-to-general and general-to-
specific approaches. 
    
Table 9. Comparison of integration patterns for 1994–2000 and 2001–2019, % 
 
Group of region pairs Specific-to-general 
approach 
General-to-specific 
approach 
 1994–2000 2001–2019 1994–2000 2001–2019 
Perfectly integrated 54.7 25.2 (20.5) 25.8  8.4 (11.8) 
Conditionally integrated 29.2 47.8 (28.2) 32.6  30.9 (20.6) 
Tending towards integration 11.3 3.3 (3.3 ) 34.3  17.3 (10.0) 
Extent of integration 95.2 76.3 (52.0) 92.7  56.6 (42.4) 
Non-integrated 4.8 23.7 (48.0) 7.3  43.4 (57.6) 
   Out of these, diverging 1.1 7.7 (6.8)  3.6  27.5 (16.4) 
Notes: The data are proportions of all region pairs. Results for 2001–2019 obtained with the use of 
unit root testing described in the second section are in parentheses (under the specific-to-general 
approach, they are from Table 2). 
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There is a great difference between 1994–2000 and 2001–2019. Prior to 1992, most of 
consumer prices in Russia were centrally-fixed. In January 1992, they were decontrolled. However, 
no market institutions existed by that time; the wholesale trade and the most part of retail trade were 
state-owned. Such institutions were emerging during the early 1990s due to mass privatization and 
market self-organization. As a result, spatial arbitrage came into play since about 1994. Beginning in 
that year, the improvement in integration of Russia’s regional markets was observed. The period of 
1994–2000 was that of further transition from centrally-planned to market economy; ‘artificial’ 
barriers to interregional trade were progressively lowering over time (Gluschenko, 2010). In 2001–
2019, by contrast, the Russian economy was functioning as a market one. At least, there were no 
fundamental differences in the functioning of markets for consumer goods in Russia and long-
standing market economies.  
Figure 8 gives an idea of processes in the market in a generalized form, plotting distribution 
of the basket cost relative to the national average price for 1994 and 2000. (Convergence clubs are 
detected in no one year of 1994–2000.) Comparing this figure with Figure 2, we can see that the 
shape of the distribution changed by the final year much more than in 2001–2019. The standard 
deviation almost halved, from 0.343 in 1994 to 0.184 in 2000. Note that the most expensive region, 
Chukotka, is absent in Figure 8 because of the lack of full data. In 2000, the cost of its 25-food 
basket averaged over 7 last months of the year equalled 316% of the national average. The same 
figure for the 33-fod basket equalled 297%, reflecting the difference of two baskets. The same 
reason is responsible for uneven distributions in 2001 and 2000 in Figures 2 and 8 rather than for a 
change over one year. It is clearly seen from Figure 8 that convergence processes occurred 
intensively in 1994–2000 in the directions of both increase and decrease of relative prices.   
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Figure 8. Distribution of the cost of the 25-food basket. 
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Based on the aforesaid, one would expect integration in 1994–2000 to be poorer – with a 
greater number of converging region pairs – than in 2001–2019. Surprisingly, this is not the case. 
The extent of integration in 1994–2000 is significantly higher, exceeding 90% under both 
approaches. The use of the general-to-specific approach decreases it by merely 2.5 percent points. If 
this approach were applied to obtain the 2001–2019 pattern, the extent of integration would drop by 
18.5 percent points. As expected, the convergence rate is greater in 1994–2000. However, this is not 
the reason for higher extent of integration. The share of perfectly and conditionally integrated pairs 
is also greater in 1994–2000: 86.6% as compared to 73.0% in 2001–2019 (58.4% vs. 39.3%, 
respectively, under the general-to-specific approach). The most unexpected feature is widespread 
perfect integration in 1994–2000. The share of perfectly integrated pairs in that period is twice (or 
even three times) as much as in 2001–2019. The cases of price divergence were rare in 1994–2000. 
In the next period, their number dramatically increased, up to almost one third, if additional region 
pairs exhibiting weak divergence trends (revealed by the general-to-specific approach) were taken 
into consideration. 
Possibly, unexpected features in the difference between the 1994–2000 and 2001–2015 
patterns can be partially explained by the difference in the data. If the cost of the staples basket with 
a wider coverage of goods and cities were used for 1994–2000, the integration pattern would 
become worse. Gluschenko (2009, Figures 5 and 6) provides an indirect confirmation of this 
hypothesis. The degree of market segmentation estimated with the use of the 33-staples basket is 
higher than that estimated with the use of the 25-staples basket.  
One more hypothetical reason is the shorter time span (7 years vs. 19 years), which 
sometimes does not make it possible to reveal actual long-run properties of price dynamics. Possible 
effects of time span can be seen in Figure 3. If the time series in Figure 3(a) were analyzed over the 
initial 7 years, it would be recognized as converging. The same analysis of time series in Figure 3(d) 
would suggest perfect integration instead of random walk.5 Besides, many time series for 1994–
2000 include structural breaks caused by the 1998 financial crisis in Russia. The breaks were 
distributed across region pairs from August 1998 to January 1999. Thus, the after-break time span is 
rather short, containing 22 to 29 months. This would have prevented revealing actual behaviour of 
price differentials after the break (that differed significantly from the ‘pre-break’ behaviour).   
Thus, it can be concluded that the extent of integration in 1994–2000 is significantly 
                                                          
5 One more example relates to the current study. Initially, it covered 15 years, 2001–2015. After 
expanding the time span to 19 years, the proportion of perfectly and conditionally integrated pairs 
has decreased by 1.8 percent points, and that of converging pairs dropped by 0.9 points. 
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overstated. Nonetheless, this does not provide a full explanation. This relates specifically to the 
divergence stretching over 7.7% of region pairs in 2001–2019. More detailed and deeper study is 
needed to find reasons for this phenomenon. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Using the cost of the basket of 33 basic food goods as the price representative and analyzing 
behaviour of its differential in all pairs of country’s regions over 2001–2019, this article obtains a 
comprehensive spatial pattern of market integration in Russia. That is, distinguishing among 
different ‘grades’ of integration, this pattern shows how many regions are perfectly integrated, 
conditionally integrated, moving towards integration (converging), and non-integrated (diverging 
among these) with each region of the country.  
Perfectly and conditionally integrated region pairs have been found to amount to 48.7% of all 
pairs. Taking account of more severe unit root tests (than those in common use) exploited, this 
figure is comparable with that for the U.S.: be commonly used tests applied, it would run to 73.0%. 
Thus, there is no a fundamental difference in the extent of product market integration between 
modern Russia and long-standing market economies. The pattern obtained is not static. Processes of 
its improvement have been found as well: 3.3% of region pairs are converging. This should 
eventually lead to integration between regions in these pairs. At the same time, 6.8% of the pairs are 
diverging, deteriorating market integration in the country.6 Contrary to expectations, the European 
part of Russia proves to be less integrated than the Asian part, despite more favourable prerequisites 
for market integration in European Russia  
Further analysis reveals that although the role of distance in conditional integration prevails, 
‘artificial’ impediments to integration (quantified by the difference in markups) are not negligible, 
contributing on average 7.4% to the price differential in conditionally integrated regions and 
decreasing the probability of perfect integration. However, the distance explains non-integration 
partially, in some subsamples of region pairs only. This leads to a conclusion that the reasons for 
non-integration are for the most part idiosyncratic. It is highly likely that it is regional protectionism 
that prevents integration of a number of regions, especially in European Russia. It is worth noting 
that this is not a peculiar feature of the Russian market. As Herrmann-Pillath, Libman & Yu (2014) 
note, local protectionism plays a substantial role in many federations and decentralized states.  
Intuitive considerations suggest that market integration in Russia in 2001–2019 should be 
                                                          
6 Ritola (2008) also finds both processes in China. 
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stronger than in 1994–2000, when transition from centrally-planed to market economy was in 
progress. Surprisingly, the comparison does not confirm the expectation. This can be partially 
referred to the fact that the extent of integration in 1994–2000 is overstated because of shorter time 
span. However, some differences between the patterns remain unexplained. 
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